OpEd column copied from the March 1st issue of The Economist. Don the Con is playing diplomacy poker by turning face up some of his best cards. So far it seems he's given up a lot without getting anything back.
"IF AMERICA MUST be ruthless, at least let it be brilliant. That is the prayer that defenders of President Donald Trump must murmur, as he blames Ukraine for being invaded and sides with Russia at the UN. Mr Trump’s admirers need to believe that cold yet clever gambits explain his concessions to Russia’s leader, Vladimir Putin. One popular theory involves China. It is claimed that Mr Trump is wooing Russia to prise it from the arms of China, the superpower that is America’s most daunting rival. Some call this a “reverse Kissinger”.
The tag makes superficial sense. In the depths of the cold war, Henry Kissinger served as diplomatic counsellor to Richard Nixon, a president of large talents, weakly constrained by principle. Starting in 1970 the two men pulled off a masterstroke. They opened secret channels of communication with Chairman Mao Zedong, China’s Communist Party leader. Embracing Mao was not for the squeamish: the ageing tyrant had much blood on his hands. Mao’s great ambition was to end American support for Taiwan, the Nationalist-held island he considered a rebel province to be retaken by China. Declassified transcripts show Kissinger hinting on missions to Beijing that America would not block Taiwan’s conquest, going far beyond his government’s public line.
A mix of motives inspired Nixon’s outreach, leading to his visit to China in 1972. Some involved selfish national interests, notably his (forlorn) hope that China might help him end America’s war in Vietnam. Some, though, reflected Nixon’s belief in America’s responsibilities as guardian of a stable world order. Sounding quite the globalist, he wrote in 1967: “We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbours.”
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s original intention was not to play a “China card” to contain the USSR. The pair hoped to stop China from backing Maoist insurgencies in the developing world. They talked, too, about usefully unsettling Soviet leaders, to prod them into arms-control pacts and other forms of detente with America. Only later would China and America forge an anti-Soviet partnership, including, astonishingly, CIA listening posts in Xinjiang, in China’s far west, to spy on Soviet missile launches. Over the next two decades China relied on the West, not the Soviet Union, for its modernisation.
Today, members of Mr Trump’s inner circle offer various justifications for ending Ukraine’s war and bringing Mr Putin in from the cold. Most involve China. Explaining America’s waning interest in Europe’s security, the defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, says “the United States is prioritising deterring war with China in the Pacific.” Vice-president J.D. Vance calls it “ridiculous” for America to “push Russia into the hands of the Chinese”, and also “ridiculous” for Russia to be “junior partner to the Chinese”. In Trumpworld a reverse-Kissinger play is an America First move. Alas, it is bad history and a still worse analysis of the present.
Most important, America did not drive China and the Soviet Union apart. By the late 1960s the former allies were on the brink of war. Emboldened by Maoist fervour and dreams of global revolution (and a hefty dose of nationalism), China accused the USSR of “socialist imperialism”, calling that worse than America’s capitalist imperialism. At one point 45 Soviet army divisions massed on China’s border. Artillery duels raised fears of nuclear strikes.
Now China is the vastly stronger power, dominating Russia, its former “Big Brother”. Signs abound of Russian ambivalence about that dependence on China. After its invasion of Ukraine triggered sanctions in the West, Russia has increasingly relied on Chinese buyers of its commodities, and on Chinese suppliers for tools and components that keep its factories humming, especially those churning out drones, missiles and tanks. Mr Putin has hinted at the hard bargains driven by China when buying his country’s energy. But now that commerce is booming, the two countries can see how well their economies fit together.
It is also true that the neighbours’ diplomatic and security interests are not perfectly aligned. On the Chinese side, well-connected scholars say European governments are being unfair when they accuse China of backing Russia in its war with Ukraine. They admit, though, that the perception of support for Russia has gravely damaged Chinese interests in Europe. The same Chinese scholars grumble about Russia’s ever-closer ties with North Korea, their country’s troublesome neighbour and supposed ally. They express fears that North Korea might be repaid for sending troops to Ukraine with high-tech weaponry that destabilises the region. China and Russia are scratchy, suspicious partners, in other words. But this is not 1969. Russia is not frightened of China, and China is not frightened of Russia. Rather, the two countries are convinced that they are locked in a long-term contest for primacy with America, one which will outlast Donald Trump.
Selfishness and ruthlessness are not the same thing.
Those portraying Mr Trump as a master strategist have one last problem. It is not even clear that Mr Trump believes he is walking in the footsteps of Nixon and Kissinger. He often seems impatient with geopolitics, and indeed with the notion that foreigners have history and core beliefs of their own. Instead, he seems to see ideology as an irritating obstacle to cutting business deals. In contrast, Mr Xi and Mr Putin are obsessed with history. They are masters at using geopolitical tensions and ideological differences to accrue power. Both leaders have stoked fears of external threats and of Western infiltration to impose harsh repression at home.
If Mr Trump is isolating any country it is his own, as he divides America from allies in Europe and the wider West. Admirers can call that ruthless if they must. Kissingerian cunning it is not."■