Kerch Strait Bridge destroyed


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Posted by confused442 on November 17, 2026 at 03:21:01

Ukraine's Changing Battlefield and Russia's Growing Logistical Problems

The railway portion of the Crimean Bridge is damaged, but the more significant development is the destruction of the automobile section. Debris from the collapsed roadway is obstructing the shipping channel.

This potentially blocks the direct maritime connection between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. For Crimea, the consequences could be enormous. The peninsula depends heavily on outside supplies of energy, food, and water, and resupplying it is becoming increasingly difficult.

Russia previously relied on the bridge and a handful of ferries to move supplies into Crimea. Ukraine has repeatedly attacked the ferries, making that alternative increasingly unreliable.

Supplies will now have to travel through occupied southern Ukraine and down the peninsula, with traffic funneled across two temporary bridges. The problem is that this is the same transportation corridor Russia uses to supply its entire southern front.

The additional traffic will create a major logistical bottleneck. Ukrainian drones regularly attack military convoys along this route, which has earned it the nickname "Highway of Death." The implications extend beyond military logistics: anyone trying to escape Crimea may also have to use this same increasingly dangerous road.

Starlink and the Changing Technology War

Elon Musk's restrictions on Starlink and Starshield capabilities have accelerated efforts by other countries to develop alternative satellite communications networks. Canada, Europe, Israel, Russia, Amazon, and Ukraine are all pursuing alternatives. Replacing Starlink's capabilities will take years, but the war has demonstrated the strategic danger of depending on a privately controlled communications system.

Ukraine has been adapting by using alternative satellite communications, including Israeli technology. Although these systems are reportedly slower and less capable than Starlink, they provide additional connectivity and help Ukraine maintain its operational capabilities.

Ukraine is also having their drones travel along the borders of Poland and the Baltics stealing their Starlink Signal as they travel north towards St Petersburg

Ukraine's Escalating Campaign Against Russian Energy Infrastructure

Ukraine's attacks on Russian refineries have also intensified after waiting 10 days to see if Russia would also stop bombing Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukraine resumed targeting Russian energy a day before the midterm elections.

Previously, Ukraine often targeted one or two critical components of a refinery, causing damage that could take months to repair. Now, the strategy appears to be shifting toward scorched earth with larger coordinated attacks, sometimes involving four to ten drones or missiles against a single target.

Ukraine is averaging approximately 350 drones and missiles per day, with occasional waves exceeding 1,000 like yesterday. These larger attacks are designed to saturate Russian air defenses and overwhelm their ability to intercept incoming weapons.

Russia, by comparison, launches approximately 150 drones and missiles in its typical large-scale attacks. Ukraine has improved its ability to intercept drones and cruise missiles, but ballistic missiles remain particularly difficult to defend against.

A New Ukrainian Military Leadership and Tactical Innovation

The change in Ukraine's military leadership has coincided with an impressive wave of tactical innovation across the front.

In the Lyman sector, Ukraine has reportedly reclaimed approximately 70 square kilometers by deploying a combination of aerial drones, grenade-dropping drones, suicide drones, and missile-equipped ground robots behind Russian positions. The strategy is to disrupt supply lines, create confusion, and force Russian troops to defend multiple directions simultaneously.

What makes this particularly significant is that Ukraine has now retaken more than half of the territory Russia captured throughout the entire year. This is shaping up to be Russia's deadliest year of the war while producing its smallest territorial gains, highlighting the increasingly unfavorable relationship between Russian casualties and battlefield progress.

In other sectors, Ukraine is deploying formations of approximately 30 ground robots, supported by aerial drones, as the leading element of assaults against Russian positions. Elsewhere, Ukrainian forces are using tunnels to infiltrate Russian lines, including through infrastructure inherited from the Soviet era.

These tactics represent a significant departure from the traditional Soviet-style approach of relying on mass infantry assaults and artillery.

The previous commander, Oleksandr Syrskyi, has been criticized for accepting extremely high casualty rates, corruption, and maintaining an operational philosophy rooted in Soviet military doctrine. His command structure has since undergone changes, with forces being redistributed among Ukraine's more innovative and effective formations.

Three formations stand out in particular:

3rd Army Corps: Built around the highly experienced 3rd Assault Brigade and associated with innovative battlefield tactics.

2nd Army Corps (Khartiia): Known for integrating technology, intelligence, and modern military organization.

Azov Corps: Developed from the Azov military formation and known for its experienced leadership and organizational capabilities.

These formations have demonstrated an ability to adapt, coordinate technology with ground forces, and conduct operations that produce territorial gains. Unfortunately, much of the wider Ukrainian military still struggles with leadership and organizational practices inherited from its Soviet past.

Russia's Casualty Problem

Perhaps the most consequential development is the rate at which Russia is losing personnel.

Estimates suggest Russian casualties have reached approximately 2,500 soldiers per day during particularly intense periods. If sustained, that rate would substantially exceed Russia's ability to recruit replacements.

Russia can continue mobilizing personnel, but replacing experienced soldiers is considerably more difficult than simply filling vacancies. The growing imbalance between battlefield losses and recruitment could become one of the most important constraints on Russia's ability to sustain the war.


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