In the past, the U.S. was able to recognize when Russia was bluffing about a potential invasion because Russia was not deploying the necessary support infrastructure, such as mobile field hospitals.
Now, however, Russia appears to be positioning mobile medical facilities and other support infrastructure along the Baltic region. At the same time, Poland has reportedly developed contingency plans for a potential refugee influx.
There are other developments worth watching. CIA Director John Ratcliffe recently made a surprise trip to Moscow to meet with his Russian intelligence counterparts. The meeting was unusual enough to attract significant attention, particularly given that the last comparable CIA-director trip to Moscow preceded the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Russia is also continuing to test NATO below the threshold of open war. Western governments have attributed a number of sabotage and covert operations to Russian intelligence, including attacks involving ammunition facilities, defense-industry targets, cyberattacks, arson and incendiary devices. NATO has publicly described Russian activity in Allied countries as including sabotage, cyberattacks and other hybrid operations.
Just last week, there was also a Russian drone strike near the Poland-Ukraine border that Ukrainian officials said may have targeted trains carrying Boris Johnson and former CIA director David Petraeus. The actual target remains an allegation rather than an established fact.
Polymarket currently puts the probability of Russia beginning an offensive intended to establish control over territory in a NATO country by the end of 2026 at roughly 6%. Importantly, that market is specifically about an offensive intended to establish territorial control; it does not include every possible form of Russian aggression against NATO.
That raises an interesting question: Why would Russia attack the Baltics when it has not been able to decisively defeat Ukraine?
One possible explanation is that Putin may believe he needs a political or military victory. At the same time, Ukraine has recently launched a major counteroffensive, and there are indications that Ukrainian tactics and force protection have improved under its newer leadership.
So I don't think the question is simply whether Russia can defeat NATO. The more important question may be whether Russia believes it can create a limited crisis in the Baltics that exposes weaknesses in NATO's political cohesion and willingness to respond.